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Morel_Moreau_Morella. The Metamorphoses of Adolfo Bioy Casares‘ Invention 
in a (Re) Animating Universe 
 
 
Abstract 
Adolfo Bioy Casares‘ short novel The Invention of Morel (La invención de 
Morel, 1940) envisioned the wish of human beings to define themselves 
through technology, indeed to reanimate the human as a technological 
double in an environment that gradually becomes virtual. This article 
develops the relationships connecting The Invention of Morel with three 
animating forms: the phantasmagoria, the automaton, and the machine-
environment, to stress the privileged association they make between 
invention and (re)animation. With this purpose, the paper examines key 
contributions to our understanding of simulation and automata in the 
field of animation theory, such as Alan Cholodenko‘s ‗Speculations on the 
Animation Automaton‘, but also Joubert-Laurencin‘s La lettre volante. 
Quatre essais sur le cinema d’animation, which directly addresses Bioy 
Casares‘ story as a metaphor of animated cinema. Sigmund Freud‘s 
psychoanalytical approach to the field of aesthetics in ‗The Uncanny‘, and 
subsequent theories like Masahiro Mori‘s ‗The Uncanny Valley‘, are also 
taken into consideration. 
 
Key words 
Phantasmagoria, animation, literature, invention, machine, island, 
automata, Morel, Adolfo Bioy Casares 
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This island, and its buildings, is our private paradise. […] Even if 
we left tomorrow, we would be here eternally, repeating 
consecutively the moments of this week, powerless to escape from 
the consciousness we had in each one of them — the thoughts and 
the feelings that the machine captured. We will be able to live a 
life that is always new. 
Adolfo Bioy Casares, The Invention of Morel, 1940, p. 76 
 
Introduction 
 
In 1940, the Argentinean writer Adolfo Bioy Casares published his short 
novel The Invention of Morel (La invención de Morel). In the book, Morel creates 
a machine to animate copies that perfectly resemble human life. But the 
inescapable condition in order for those copies to exist is to replace the living 
models — even possibly acquiring their souls. This unique story has had a great 
influence on film, from Alain Resnais‘ unofficial adaptation in Last Year at 
Marienbad (L'Année dernière à Marienbad, 1960), to recent TV series such as 
Lost (J.J. Abrahams et al., 2004-10), which repeats the idea of the island as a 
place for invention. Although The Invention of Morel has been regarded as an 
allegory of cinema, I will argue that its most inherent properties are related to 
animation not only in the sense of imparting motion to the inert, but also in 
giving it a ‗soul‘. 
Bioy Casares‘ novella envisioned the desire for human beings to be 
defined through technology, indeed to re-animate themselves as the 
technological double of the human in an environment turned virtual. Following 
this line, The Invention of Morel has established a dialogue with works 
suggesting a re-fabrication of the human, from H.G. Wells‘ The Island of Doctor 
Moreau (1896) to Auguste Villiers de l'Isle-Adam‘s The Future Eve (L’Eve future, 
1886), the novel that popularized the term ‗android‘. And, as in Oscar Wilde‘s 
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The Portrait of Dorian Gray (1890), in Bioy Casares‘ short novel the imagining of a 
cannibalistic object becomes central, this time a machine that consumes the 
people that it pictures. This essay proposes a transversal reading of the book, 
where the human is re-animated as an apparatus, a doubling device that re-
produces the living as an illusion. 
 
The Invention of Morel tells the story of an escapee from prison who flees to 
an abandoned island, known to be the focal point of a mysterious disease. 
However, there are signs of human presence on this island, like a group of 
young people dressed in an old-fashioned manner, who live in a mansion. They 
are guests of Morel, the owner of the house. Since the escapee is afraid of being 
discovered, he does not interact with this group, becoming instead a voyeur of 
their daily life. In this way, he realizes that they periodically repeat the same 
actions — for instance, there is a woman who always sits at the same place to 
stare at the sea. The woman, called Faustine, intrigues the unnamed castaway 
so much so that he wishes to get her attention; but every time he tries to address 
her, she seems to ignore him. Finally, the castaway witnesses Morel‘s confession 
to his guests: he has been recording them during their holidays, using a 
machine of his own invention, which is hidden in the residence‘s cellar. Morel‘s 
machine records and perfectly replicates human models in their scenes of daily 
routines. But the inescapable condition for those copies to exist is to replace the 
living models: the resulting images will remain forever on the island, while the 
human models will die a terrible death. Due to the impossibility of leaving the 
island, and to his fatal love for Faustine, the fugitive uses the machine to record 
himself alongside the island‘s ghosts — despite the certainty of his demise as a 
result — to access their re-animated dimension and share with them the scenes 
of their past happiness. 
 
Significantly, in Bioy Casares‘ novel, invention adopts the form of 
animation. The Invention of Morel stresses the privileged association between 
invention and animation (in the form of reanimation), which emerges in settings 
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such as the island — a laboratory apart from the ‗real‘, ordinary world, where 
the most uncanny ideas can be implemented. Indeed, Bioy Casares‘ novella 
arguably envisions the ambivalent desire of human beings to be defined 
through technology, even to reanimate themselves as the technological double 
of the human in an environment that becomes increasingly virtual. 
With this purpose, I will examine three key aspects in the novella that 
illustrate the animatic in film: the phantasmagoria, the automaton, and the machine 
environment. The first section of this article will discuss the construction of 
replicas by Morel‘s machine, resulting in a modern phantasmagoria that recalls 
the history of pre-cinema and, at the same time, anticipates future technology 
— with the mirror as the conceptual model in the construction of simulacra. In 
the second section, I will incorporate the automaton as a metaphor for the 
technologies between the human and its invention for the screen: the CGI 
hyper-realistic human characters, which take from living models to be 
animated, frequently awaking in the audience a feeling of the uncanny. The last 
section elaborates the notion of the machine-environment: a place properly 
isolated for experimentation, an engine that animates a fiction no other than a 
story of eternal re-enactment. 
 
 
1. A Doorway to Eternity: the Invention of Phantasmagoria 
 
By 1937 […] I glimpsed to the idea of The Invention of Morel. I believe 
that such an idea came from the ravishment that caused me the 
vision of my mother‘s dressing room, infinitely repeated in the 
deepest perspectives of her three-phased Venetian mirror. […] The 
possibility of a machine that would achieve the artificial 
reproduction of a man, for the five or more senses that we have, with 
the sharpness of a mirror reproducing these images, became the 
essential subject of the book. 
Adolfo Bioy Casares, 1991, Autobiography1 
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The novel delves into a stimulating view of cinema as a means of 
achieving eternity: the imagining of an enduring form, a resistant body that can 
be repaired and re-activated — or replayed, like cinematographic images. In his 
fable, Bioy Casares proposes a hyperbolic form of film, one that would fix 
visions of humankind ‗for the five or more senses that we have‘. As a result, the 
Morelian machine fabricates a multidimensional portrait of the living that 
shares the seductive power of phantasmagoria, the paradox of what exists and 
is non-existing at the same time, proposing a journey to the pre-history of 
cinema. 
The phantasmagoria has its origins in the famous show — close to a 
Spiritualist fraud — by Belgian scientist Robertson at the end of French 
Revolution in Paris. However, phantasmagoria, as a concept, has a privileged 
relation to animation: for Joubert-Laurencin (1997, p. 67), an animated film 
always recalls some or all of the elements of Phantasmagoria, which constitutes 
the multiple and un-organized film base unit; as a consequence, every animated 
film re-actualizes Phantasmagoria, ‗playing‘ the invention of cinema: "In other 
words, any animated film worthy of the name produces an invention (an 
update) of Phantasmagoria, and, therefore, in its most complete version, plays 
the invention of cinema." (Joubert-Laurencin, 1997, p. 67, translation by the 
author).2 Phantasmagoria is the spectral experience in the advent of cinema — 
from the Camera Obscura to the Lumiéres‘ ‗moving photography‘. But, more 
decisively for my purposes, the idea of phantasmagoria is still present in 
current devices such as virtual reality, stereoscopic cinema — 3D film —, or 
even mapping buildings. Nonetheless, the obsession to add ‗dimensions‘ to the 
cinema of today does not contribute to a realistic effect, but it rather increases 
the sensation of the uncanny. To prove this, let me describe the sensation of 
being in a virtual reality ‗cave‘: Virtual reality is produced inside a cubic setting 
composed of four screens, where the viewer plays a dual role, that of an actor 
and a spectator. In this place, the viewer inside receives different signals (Fig. 
1), no other than the images projected onto the ‗cave‘ screens, whose 
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combination will produce in their retina a perfectly deceptive three dimensional 
image. The result is the simulation of volume synchronized with the viewer, but 
in my opinion a ghosted and ghosting experience — never a consistent one. 
Nevertheless, phantasmagoria‘s mutations into new technologies prove its 
capacity to still fascinate us. 
 
 
Caption for Figure 1 
The virtual reality ‘cave’, with the viewer-performer inside, as can be experienced at Universitat 
Politècnica de València, Spain. The figure shows simulation of being into a car. ® Máster de 
Animación, Universitat Politècnica de València, 2011. 
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Caption for Figure 2 
Mirrors have been a cinematic device often used to depict doubling effects — The Lady from 
Shanghai (Orson Welles, 1947) — or to suggest infinite spaces— Citizen Kane (idem, 1941). 
The figure here is a screen grab from Welles’ The Lady from Shanghai. © Columbia Pictures, 
1947. 
 
 
I propose that these re-animating technologies are comparable to the 
Morelian machine, which re-doubles reality, creating a disturbing yet appealing 
phantasmagoria. In the novel, the island appears as a great abandoned house of 
cinema, as if they had forgot to switch off the projector. At first, the island 
presents features beyond the castaway‘s understanding: there are two suns and 
two moons, and the temperature is twice as high; in a pond, fish are swimming 
among dead ones, because the living fish are screen images of the dead ones. 
The island is somehow like a maze of mirrors (Fig. 2), where the prisoner 
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cannot distinguish the real from its simulation, as the inventor explains: "You 
must not forget that I am speaking of images extracted from mirrors, with the 
sounds, tactile sensations, flavours, odours, temperatures, all synchronized 
perfectly. An observer will not realize that they are images". (Bioy Casares, 
1940, p. 70) And the castaway‘s fascination towards this phantasmagoria will be 
the fascination for a ghost: a ghost does not have a life on its own; it only exists 
to be perceived, as an object of desire.  
Moreover, the novel reveals an animistic view of this technological, 
illusory scenery: the human inhabitants on the island are replicas instead of 
living models, who decades ago abandoned this place — only to be found on a 
yacht, emaciated beyond recognition. The inventor describes to his guests the 
reduplicating process in detailed yet elusive terms: for Morel, the living is just a 
kind of multi-dimensional broadcasting, the linkage of different signs for each 
sense, which can be isolated, reproduced and synchronized. But, as these 
images are ‗extracted from mirrors‘, a Narcissistic object that kills by doubling, 
their lethal consequences of their models bring back the primary fright inspired 
by mirrors — a fear rooted in the realm of animism: "When all the senses are 
synchronized, the soul emerges. That was to be expected. When Madeleine 
existed for the senses of sight, hearing, taste, smell and touch, Madeleine herself 
was actually there" (ibid, p. 71). 
 
Since these copies are endowed with all the external sensations of the 
living, Morel assumes that the person, their anima, is already there. However, to 
find out if these replicas have a soul — or are even aware of themselves — it 
would be necessary to build another machine to access their thoughts and 
feelings (ibid, p. 82). This suggestion of animism in the book re-actualizes the 
fear inspired by the Dopplegänger, as described by Sigmund Freud in his 
famous essay ‗The Uncanny‘ (‗Das Unheimliche‘, 1919): a double conceived to 
preserve life after death, which finally becomes a symbol of a near death 
because it threatens to supplant us. 
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This ‗lifedeath‘3 of the Morelian copies the re-animating power of a 
machine composed of mirrors that draws underground relations with 
animation; not only in the sense of imparting motion to the inert, but also in 
giving it a soul. It may seem naïve that such a sophisticated mechanism had a 
basis as ingenuous as mirrors; however, according to Joubert-Laurencin, the 
looking-glass is no other than an anomalous object perpetuated in "the mix of 
new and archaism, which is a likely specific to science fiction" (1997: 125)4 — as 
he writes in reference to to the famous photo scanner in Ridley Scott‘s Blade 
Runner (1982). The Morelian machine, described in elliptic terms, also obeys this 
combination: its conceptual model conjoins permanence in time and infinite 
space, through the ‗deepest perspectives‘ reflected by confronted mirrors — as 
observed by Bioy Casares in his mother‘s boudoir, in the citation at the start of 
this section. 
 
 
Caption for Figure 3 
Émile Reynaud’s moment of inspiration to build his Praxinoscope when he saw his little 
child passing between the mirrors at his cabinet. Screen caption from Pierre Levie’s 
documentary film La Préhistoire du Cinéma: Merci, Mr. Robertson. © Sofidoc 1995 (Brussels). 
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Caption for Figure 4 
Reynaud playing his Théâtre Optique. Screen caption from Pierre Levie’s documentary 
film La Préhistoire du Cinéma: Merci, Mr. Robertson. © Sofidoc 1995 (Brussels). 
 
Remarkably, this metaphorical image not only brings to mind the 
keystone moment in the writer‘s career, but also the animation devices that 
prepared the advent of cinema. Mirrors, which can show what we cannot see 
directly, were required to see the moving pictures on the rotating disc of Joseph 
Plateau‘s Phenakistiscope (1832), and the spinning drum of mirrors in Émile 
Reynaud‘s Praxinoscope (1876) was also intended to cause stroboscopic effect 
(Figs. 3, 4). Therefore, the looking glass — the instrument for imagination, 
which took Alice to its other side — not only played a central role in the 
perception of animation at the time, but it may also be said that mirrors 
animated cinema. 
Eventually, the reproductions in The Invention of Morel, conceived as solid 
objects that move, share in many senses the status of a wax museum, a veritable 
mausoleum of the famous — where the visitors can take photos of themselves 
alongside the frozen celebrities, pretending to interact with them. And, as do 
these visitors, the castaway of the novel records himself with the copies on the 
island, because the resulting recording does not distinguish between the copies 
and the living. In this sense, digital cinema, with its obsession to add 
‗dimensions‘ to its simulations, still recalls, the ingenuous,  but distressing, 
magic of a house of mirrors. The next section will examine another disquieting 
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form of human representation: the automaton, which can be regarded as a 
symbolic relative of cinema. 
 
 
2. Mechanical Dreamers: on Automata and other Doubles 
 
A fascination binds the proto-history of cinema, the advent of cinema 
and the advent of cartoon animation. It is the fascination with the 
mysterious imbrications and reanimation of life and motion by 
means of an apparatus. […] It is the fascination with the way in 
which that apparatus may be thought to have reanimated the world 
in and as simulation. It is the fascination with the automaton. 
Alan Cholodenko, 2007, ‗Speculations on the Animatic Automaton‘, 
p. 496. 
 
A recent film on Georges Méliès‘ life has recovered the image of the 19th 
Century automaton, magically connected to the origins of cinema: Hugo (Martin 
Scorsese, 2011). In this film, the automaton is the last vestige of an unknown 
genius, but its inner mechanism is partly disassembled so that it does not work. 
Later, we will discover that these lost components proved useful to the 
automaton‘s creator so that he could set up his first film camera. Once repaired, 
the automaton reveals its special gift: it is not an automaton that writes, as 
seemed at first, but one that can draw. It portrays a milestone of early cinema: 
Georges Méliès‘ rocket stuck in the face of the Moon (Le Voyage dans la lune, 
1902). It is interesting to speculate what would have happened if the film had 
depicted the android drawing another design, slightly different from the 
preceding one. Then the automaton would be a highly advanced 
cinematographic machine: it would be an animator. 
Automata are a powerful evocation for fantasy. As well as finding their special 
place in literature, so they did in cinema: as robots, ‘replicants’ or machine-men 
and -women, these technological reflections of the human invite us to question 
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whether we are really relevant — and, for this reason, "J. F. Sebastian’s 
replicants in Blade Runner have an expiration date. They are much better than us 
to keep walking around a long time." (Bueno, Peirano, 2009, p. 283).5 Still far 
from such mechanisms in the future — perhaps not so distant for us —,as we 
know them, automata were built as scientific curiosities or as fairground 
attractions: they were very sophisticated mechanisms, yet very basic in terms of 
what they could do.6 As Patrick J. Gyger appreciates, automata do not have life 
but an appearance of it, however they might convey an image stronger than 
reality, indeed a form that matches our desires (Gyger, 2009, p. XI)7 — I would 
add, like the Morelian copies. 
The automaton, or more precisely, the automatic, has been present in cinema 
since early times. Pioneers like Méliès discovered the properties of stop-action 
shooting and found the principles of stop-motion animation, introducing 
changes frame by frame. Thus the Victorian fascination with self-propulsion 
reached the screen, with films like James Stuart Blackton’s The Haunted Hotel 
(1907) and Segundo de Chomón’s El hotel eléctrico (1908), in which objects from 
daily life moved with inexplicable autonomy through an eerie — or 
technologically advanced — environment. Donald Crafton suggests films like 
these started the ‘haunted hotel’ genre (1982: 24), initiating a wave of 
subsequent productions that displayed the re-animation of the inert in a new, 
irrepressible life. 
The Invention of Morel seems to re-actualize this ‗haunted hotel‘ genre in 
literature, with the islanders repeating their daily routines at an enchanted 
house — the ‗Museum‘ in the book. Significantly, the novella proposes the re-
invention of the human as an activity diverse from medicine or surgery. Morel‘s 
apparatus makes its simulations directly from and for the senses, in a conjoint of 
science and art that, for Max Milner, makes The Invention of Morel a "great 
Berkeleyan fiction in which esse est percipi is pushed to its ultimate 
consequences" (1982, p. 258, translation by the author).8 
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But if The Invention of Morel is regarded as an allegory for cinema, the 
novel also anticipates mediating technologies between the human and their 
animated doubles, like CGI animation, and more recently the animation of 
hyper-realistic human characters based on motion capture (mocap) — automata 
made specifically for the screen. Mocap evokes a pervading technology that has 
already replaced other doubling mechanisms in filmmaking, such as the use of 
animatronics; and, even when it closely depends on the use of actors, it also 
suggests the idea of their long-term replacement in cinema. 
Needless to say, the use of mocap to animate hyper-realistic human 
characters helps to minimize the work of digital animators (although it does not 
exclude it) through mechanical processes that capture real movement. 
Somehow it is inspired in Eadweard Muybridge‘s and Étienne-Jules Marey‘s 
practices in chronophotography, with the computer combining a multiplicity of 
signals registered from many camera views. It can be said that mocap is a 
means as vampirical as Morel‘s invention — ―To make living reproduction, I 
need living transmitters. I do not create life.‖ (Bioy Casares, 1940: 71). And, like 
machine-based automata, the digitally animated characters in Robert Zemeckis‘ 
Beowulf (2007) and in Spielberg‘s Tintin: The Secret of the Unicorn (2011) inspire 
ambivalent sensations in audiences. Their illusory appearance does not 
correspond to what we understand as real; this is similar to what happens when 
we see sophisticated hand-made simulations such as a hyper-realistic picture or 
a ‗trompe-l‘oeil‘ image. As Jean Baudrillard explains in Fatal Strategies, 
simulations are the product of the true, when it soaks all the energy of the false, 
trapped in a vertiginous spiral where it loses its character of authenticity 
(Baudrillard, 1983: 7). 
In her illuminating essay ‗Final Fantasies: Computer Graphic Animation 
and the [Dis]Illusion of Life‘, Vivian Sobchack suggests that "the ‗hyper-reality‘ 
of CGI resolution and detail […] constitutes a ‗hyperbolic‘ effect in relation to 
what we perceive […] as ‗the structure of reality‘" (2006, p. 179). This 
‗hyperbolic‘ aspect responds to the increasing commitment to realism assumed 
by CGI animation, though paradoxically it transforms our vision of hyper-
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realistic animation as simulacra. Contrary to this effect, it can be asserted that 
the viewers need to complete by themselves the illusion of the living, while the 
astounding amount of data in CGI images — skin, materials, lighting — gives 
small room for imagination, keeping us away from our ‗structure of reality‘. 
 
 
Caption for Figure 5 
SITGES 2011 official poster based on the ‘artificial intelligence’ leit motiv, with a Geminoid F 
developed by Osaka University and ATR Hiroshi Ishiguro laboratory. Courtesy of SITGES 
Festival Internacional de Cinema Fantàstic de Catalunya and CHINA Advertising Agency © 
2011. 
 
The disturbing impression inspired by highly realistic — but not identical 
— reproductions of the human — as when we see people with realistic 
prosthetic parts, or entire robots like Hiroshi Ishiguro‘s in Figure 5 — can be 
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explained through Mashahiro Mori‘s hypothesis of the ‗Uncanny Valley‘, a 
theory on cybernetics that has great potential to be applied to the viewers' 
experience of hyper-realistic CGI. Working with Freud‘s essay mentioned 
above, and Ernst Jentsch's On the Psychology of the Uncanny (1906), Mori‘s theory 
proposes that when human observers first interact with replicas — for instance, 
androids that look and act almost like human beings, but not perfectly (Fig. 5) —
, they initially feel a strong empathy towards these copies until a point is 
reached beyond which their response quickly turns into rejection (Mori, 1970, 
pp. 33-35). As well, Vivian Socbhack points to a discordancy perceived when 
we see hiper-realistic CGI human characters —like in the case she describes, 
concerning the realism of hair and textures compared with the restricted 
character animation and lypsinch in Final Fantasy: The Spirits Within (Hironobu 
Sakaguchi, Motonori Sakakibara, 2001): an incompatibility that is 
fundamentally semiotic, because the visual premises of seeing animation do not 
match with the film image (Sobchack, 2006, p. 176).9 As well, in The Invention of 
Morel, the castaway‘s feeling of revulsion towards the Morelian copies is caused 
by such a semiotic mismatch, once he is aware of being living among artificial 
ghosts — "I experienced a feeling of scorn, almost disgust, for these people and 
their indefatigable, repetitious activity" (Bioy Casares, 1940, p. 75). Moreover, 
the novel also anticipates Mashahiro Mori‘s observations about the impact in 
the viewer of an imperfect human copy, when Morel explains his first attempts 
to record people, surfacing the gloomy, morbid nuances of these experiments: 
 
‗There were still some minor defects in the receiver; […] there are times 
when errors are imperceptible for unspecialized observers, but 
occasionally the deviation is broad.‘ 
‗Can you show us those first images?‘ asked Stoever. 
‗If you wish, of course; but I warn you that some of the ghosts are slightly 
monstrous!‘ replied Morel. (ibid, p. 72) 
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According to Morel it is not when the deviation is broad that we perceive 
the effects of monstrosity, but rather when the difference is slight! Most hyper-
realistic 3D human characters, endowed with the appearance of mechanical 
reproduction — as opposed to organic production that in animation we relate to 
the spiritual, to having a soul (Broadfoot, Butler, 1999, p. 273)10 — seem 
alienating because they do not seem to have a life of their own, as if the pre-
eminence of automatized animation systems had devoured the anima of 
animation. Notably, the inconsistency of digital characters is primarily 
perceived in the appearance of their eyes, often lifeless due to the limitations to 
capture the movement of the players‘ eyes, resulting in the disturbing 'dead eye 
syndrome‘.11 This effect transforms realistic animated human characters into 
virtual automata — like E.T.A Hoffmann in The Sandman (Der Sandmann, 1816), 
when he describes the automaton Olympia as a lovely female doll but with 
opaque eyes and mechanic movements, who at first causes admiration, and 
later, disdain.12 
 
In summary, contemporary use of mocap in cinema invites us to establish 
a dialogue with Bioy Casares novel and with literature that preceded it about 
the reinvention of the human as a technological double. Such discussion reveals 
the residual force of animistic thinking in the modern era, for which the ‗soul‘ is 
still an imaginary quality of unanimated objects, of animals that reflect hominid 
attitudes, and of artificial copies of the human — from portraits and figurines to 
androids and CGI characters. Eventually, it is possible that the search for 
perfectly convincing realism of CGI human characters no longer will be a 
utopia, when these animated characters are able to transmit consistency and 
likeness with the audience as if they were living performers. Without the 
deliberate exposure of the trick, we would not be able to distinguish anymore 
the real and the simulation. The following section will delve into a fictional 
form of simulation, as found in adventure and science-fiction literature, but also 
in pre-cinematic devices and spaces: the machine-environment. 
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3. Machine-Environments and the Eternal Reenactment 
 
I never saved Malvina. I never made it past the sixth automaton. […] 
These thoughts preserve me now here, inside the sixth automaton, 
where I dream mechanically with the tides amongst the rocks, where 
they can never separate us. 
Felisberto in the Quay Brothers‘ The Piano Tuner of Earthquakes, 2005 
 
 
In Edinburgh one can experience an old camera obscura. The house where 
it is located is more than four centuries old, and the dark chamber resides in a 
tower equipped with a telescopic view to collect outdoor scenes. The landscape, 
the houses, but also the people walking down the street, suddenly appear on a 
concave table that serves as a screen (Figs. 6 & 7). One might play with these 
screened people: the observer can pick them with a piece of paper, or squash 
them — like animators do with their creatures. When the telescope frames the 
sky and rooftops, the sudden appearance of seagulls reminds us that we are not 
seeing a slide, but something that is happening in real time. To quote Maxim 
Gorki‘s famous article after his first experience at the cinema, the camera 
obscura does not transmit life, but "its soundless spectre" (Harding, Popple, 
1996, p. 5).13 And all this can be done duplicating just one of the sensations of 
the living: their image. If the camera obscura can inspire disturbing sensations, 
there is something from this silent spectacle that still survives in cinematic 
fiction. It is something that blooms in modern fictions. It is one of their key 
features: the idea of control; the idea of isolation, the idea of a box containing 
one‘s object of desire. It is the machine-environment. 
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Caption for Figure 6 
Camera Obscura image. Courtesy of Camera Obscura & World of Illusions, Edinburgh © 2013. 
 
 
Caption for Figure 7 
Engraving from the collection of Jack and Beverly Wilgus, representing a Camera Obscura 
show, end of 19
th
 Century. Courtesy of Camera Obscura & World of Illusions, Edinburgh © 
2013. 
 
The machine-environment could be given a preferential place in Alan 
Cholodenko‘s ‗Cryptic Complex‘ of cinema, comparable to the ‗house of 
cinema‘ — or its precedent forms, like the camera obscura — as an intermediate 
space, as a crypt: 
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To be in the house (casa) of cinema is not to be in the domus — the home. 
Its refuge could never be pure refuge, any more than it could be pure non-
refuge. Like the spectre, the movie theatre is of the order of the between. 
To be in it is to be in the haunted house, the crypt, of cinema. 
(Cholodenko, 2004, p. 110) 
 
The machine-environment is always defined in terms of an apparatus: like 
a spinning Zoetrope or a Thaumatrope, it is an engine that animates the 
illusory. It can be a dystopic system for individuals or, on the contrary, a 
‗happy‘ place, but always within a limited space. Its mark of identity is 
repetition, an eternal re-enactment of something that — maybe — already 
happened. This notion of repetition also dominates The Invention of Morel: 
referring to the novella, for Joubert-Laurencin 
 
This modern myth differs from the more mundane loss of control of the 
inventor (whose paradigm is Frankenstein), and enriches the human 
puppet, invention of Romanticism: there is a lack of distinction between 
being and appearance, combined with a mechanic repeating a process, 
and grafted onto a monstrous narcissistic apprehension of the figure of the 
double.’ Joubert-Laurencin, 1997, p. 257 (Translation by the author).14 
 
Starting from Max Milner, Joubert-Laurencin establishes in his essay 
‗Tango. Une répétition polonaise‘ a parallel between The Invention of Morel and 
the famous Polish short film, Zbigniew Rybczynski‘s Tango (1980). The film 
evokes the atmosphere of the Argentinian novel, with its little room that hosts a 
small society whose movements are untiringly reproduced, performing a kind 
of ‗playback‘ for eternity and for no one (Joubert-Laurencin, 1997, p. 263).15 
Morel‘s ‗replicants‘ are monstrous because they compete with the living, 
replacing them with an illusion: as the castaway says, "I experienced a feeling of 
scorn, almost disgust, for these people and their indefatigable, repetitious 
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activity" (Bioy Casares, 1940, p. 75); the filmed people in Tango seem also 
monstrous because, even when they take the ‗real‘ — photography — into 
animation, they behave like automata they share the same space but they do not 
interact with each other to produce changes in their routine — until the last 
iteration in the film, when the cycle is broken by the woman who throws the 
ball. As well, the castaway introduces a variation in Morel‘s ‗playback‘, when 
he uses the machine to record himself within Faustine and her friend‘s cyclical 
routine16 — the only way for him to "enter the heaven of her consciousness" 
(Bioy Casares, 1940, p. 103), a privileged space that exists by virtue of an 
animating machine: the machine-environment. 
Like the cycles from Tango, 19th century optical devices provide a powerful 
metaphor for the machine-environment that houses repetition, with the spinning 
drawings moving in loops, their cycles restricted to the limits of an apparatus. 
In this sense, Émile Reynaud‘s public show developed from his Praxinoscope, 
the Théâtre Optique (1888), set up an apparent contradiction: this screening 
machine released animation from its cyclical confinement in previous devices to 
projection on a screen; however, animation does not exist but by means of an 
apparatus — and for a Demiurge that shapes it. However, the Demiurge himself 
is absorbed by fiction, entering the space of the machine-environment, as in the 
myth of the mad inventor devoured by his own inventions —Dr Moreau 
assassinated by his Beast Folk, or Morel dying due to voluntary exposure to his 
machine.17 The tragic outcome of 'mad scientists' — the Demiurges imagined by 
Jules Verne or H.G. Wells, from Captain Nemo to the invisible Griffin — puts 
the machine-environment in a space between animation and literature. 
Nevertheless, the machine-environment rarely works as a single machine, 
but needs its complement, the environment, to work properly. In The Invention of 
Morel the machine re-animates the inhabitants of the ‗Museum‘, the house; and 
these inhabitants transform the abandoned island — a place supposed to be 
ravaged by a disease — into a place of strange properties that deceive the 
castaway. In science-fiction and fantasy writing, 18 the main characters' 
misfortunes often occur in an isolated place: the island, which does not 
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represent nature but rather a laboratory where individuals endure extreme 
situations, imaging an experimental model of society or a specular image of 
civilisation. The unpredictable features of the island, often with unusual flora 
and fauna, are also present on distant planets, lost continents or parallel 
universes, because isolation has made them original and unique. 
However, the machine-environment behaves as a more sophisticated 
engine of fiction when it establishes a structure of concentric circles between 
different typologies of isolated sceneries: ghost cities, old castles, abandoned 
houses, lost ships, mad scientists' laboratories, labyrinthine constructions, etc. 
More recently, in cinema, these ‗haunted hotels‘, enchanted or futuristic, 
illustrate a more convoluted idea of the machine-environment as a mirror-place, 
familiar and unfamiliar at the same time: these illusory places take the evil 
inversion of reality as a modus operandi. Examples are the disturbing Red 
Room in David Lynch‘s Twin Peaks (1990-91) — recalling 'redrum' (‗murder‘ 
spelled backwards), the ominous palindrome in Stanley Kubrick‘s The Shining 
(1980), a story about mazes, labyrinths, and mirrors as means of disintegrating 
space and time, or like the deceptive chrysalis in the Wachowsky Brothers‘ The 
Matrix (1999), which engenders and hosts fiction. 
Despite the inherent complexity of such a fictional strategy, sometimes the 
machine-environment appears as plainly as a simple box in the middle of 
nowhere: 
 
Let me put it so you'll understand. Picture a box. You know something 
about boxes, don't you John? What if I told you that, somewhere on this 
island, there is a very large box and whatever you imagined, whatever 
you wanted to be in it when you opened that box, there it would be? What 
would you say about that, John? (Benjamin Linus in Lost, 2004-2010, ‗The 
Man from Tallahassee‘, episode 62, 2007) 
 
Paraphrasing Omar Calabrese‘s characterisation of the literary island as a 
prevalent place for invention, the true essence of the machine-environment 
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would be "its capacity to produce passions", mirroring our intimate wishes and 
feelings (2009: 32, translation by the author).19 In this sense, probably the most 
outstanding example of machine-environment generated by animation cinema 
are the ‗metaphysical machines‘ that occupy a prominent place in the Quay 
Brothers' filmography: an object to "create an alternate universe […] not a 
dream or a nightmare but an autonomous and self-sufficient world, with its 
particular laws and lucidity" (Buchan, 2011, p. 114). These machines put the 
world under a magnifying glass, like the Kinetoscope or peep-show that 
contains the universe of Street of Crocodiles (Quay Brothers, 1986); or more 
recently the musical automata from their film The Piano Tuner of Earthquakes 
(2005), not in vain a free reinvention after Bioy Casares‘ novel. The islands‘ 
artificial ghosts are transformed into stop-motion animated artefacts restricted 
to dioramas, a set of machines that condition the life and feelings of the 
islanders. 
As a re-animating machine The Invention of Morel reenacts earlier science-
fiction novels by H.G. Wells and L‘Isle-Adams; but also texts by Verne, Edgar 
Allen Poe, and Daniel Defoe are revived in Bioy Casares‘ book — which has 
Verne's The Carpathian Castle (1892) as a main reference, a story of amorous 
fascination with the ghost of a singer. The castaway from the Argentinian 
novella falls in love with an artificial woman because of her spectral nature: "to 
be in love with one of those images was worse than being in love with a ghost 
(perhaps we always want the person we love to have the existence of a ghost)" 
(Bioy Casares, 1940: 75). Like in Chris Marker‘s La Jetée (1962), the story is an 
artefact that recalls — but never as a rescue for the living — the image of a 
spectre. To conclude this section, it can be argued that as it re-animates 
literature, the machine-environment revives a story of eternal reenactment; 
presumably the same story where a man tries to save his beloved from Hades, 
only to lose her again, of Orpheus seeking his Eurydice. 
 
 
Conclusion 
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It will be possible for all souls, both those that are intact, and the ones 
whose elements have been dispersed, to have immortality. […]. To 
make a single man (who is now disembodied) with all his elements, 
and without letting an extraneous part enter, one must have the 
patient desire of Isis when she reconstructed Osiris. 
Adolfo Bioy Casares, 1940: 78 
 
This article has shown how The Invention of Morel traces a genuine 
association between cinema, simulacra and early myths, and it includes them in 
a technological context of a device which animates believable doubles of human 
beings. Moreover, a transversal reading of The Invention of Morel not only 
suggests the refabrication of the human by its mediating technologies, but also 
points to literature discussed as presenting a machine-environment: a 
laboratory where literature is the product of a (re)animated series of succeeding 
texts and unsuspected myths. Bioy Casares‘ novella has inspired a vision of the 
island as a re-animating space, proposing a contradictory return to animism 
through the manufactured, with the reanimated as "lifedeath" (Cholodenko, 
2004: 102). Ultimately, the book suggests a story of eternal repetition, 
actualizing a mythical story of death and rebirth: the re-assembling of a 
fragmented God made of flesh that, as the citation above suggests, is inherent to 
almost all religions. 
The magic of this story is probably encrypted in its title, the name of the 
alchemist, the mad inventor: Verne's Moreau, Bioy Casares' Morel, but also a 
female counterpart, Morella. Morella (1835), by Edgar Allan Poe, is a suspense 
story in which a young woman, fond of the dark arts, finds a way to reincarnate 
herself, assuming the form of her own daughter, during whose birth Morella 
died, by adopting her shape while keeping the identity of her spirit. Although 
latent, Morella‘s spirit manifests itself when it finallypossesses the girl when she 
reaches adolescence. In this coincidence of names, I see this fiction as a mere 
pretext with which the human tries to preserve themselves from death, as 
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Hélène Cixous suggests from her reading of Freud‘s ‗The Uncanny‘: "Neither 
real nor fictitious, ‗fiction‘ is a secretion of death, an anticipation of non-
representation, a doll, a hybrid body composed of language and silence that, in 
the movement which turns it and which it turns, invents doubles, and death" 
(1976, p. 548). The Invention of Morel illustrates the human need for endurance, 
our secret hope of immortality, re-animated in a technological double in our 
"officially post religious intellectual culture" (Nelson, 2002, p. 20).20 Fiction 
reanimates characters, narratives, universes… In other words, it reanimates a 
cryptic complex not restricted to film animation, but composed of the uncanny 
and the return of death as spectre. In the case of The Invention of Morel, the crypt 
is the island itself. 
 
This article is based on a paper delivered at Animation Evolution. The 22nd Society 
for Animation Studies Annual Conference, Edinburgh College of Art, Edinburgh 
(United Kingdom), July 9-11, 2010. 
 
I want to express my acknowledgement to Dr Alan Cholodenko, Dr Maureen 
Furniss, and the anonymous reviewers who read the subsequent versions of 
this paper, for their constructive comments which led to this current form. 
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Notes 
                                                          
1 Quoted in Pichon Rivière, 1991, p. 85 (translation by the author). 
2 Original citation: 'Autrement dit: tout film d‘animation digne de ce nom 
produit une invention (une mise au jour) de la fantasmagorie, et, donc, dans sa 
version la plus complète, rejoue l‘invention du cinéma.‘ Joubert-Laurencin, 
1997, p. 67. 
3 As characterized by Alan Cholodenko after Derrida, ‗lifedeath‘ is ‗both dead 
and alive, neither dead nor alive, at the same time. […] Which means not only 
that the work of mourning cannot be completed, but also that the incorporation 
is never finished‘ (Cholodenko, 2004, p. 102). 
4 ‗Il n‘était pas impossible d‘imaginer, dans un film de science-fiction de 1982, 
un voyage dans une image en trois dimensions, comme les simulations 
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d‘ordinateur nous y ont habitués, mais ce n‘est pas le cas, car l‘intérêt de Blade 
Runner est d‘instaurer ce mélange de nouveauté et d’archaïsme, qui est un 
vraisemblable propre à la science-fiction.’ Joubert-Laurencin, 1997, p. 125 (‘It 
was not impossible to imagine a science fiction film 1982, a trip to a three-
dimensional image, such as computer simulations we have used, but this is not 
the case, as Blade Runner's interest is to establish the mix of new and archaism, 
which is a likely specific to science fiction.’ Translation by the author). 
5 Original citation: "¿Somos verdaderamente relevantes? Si podemos fabricar un 
ente autónomo que tenga todas nuestras características y ninguna de nuestras 
debilidades, ¿a quién le importará que desaparezcamos después? *…+ Por eso 
los replicantes de J. F. Sebastian en Blade Runner tienen fecha de caducidad. Son 
demasiado mejores que nosotros para seguir caminando mucho rato por ahí." 
Bueno, Peirano, 2009, p. 283 (‘Are we truly relevant? If we can make an 
autonomous entity that has all of our features and none of our weaknesses, who 
will care to disappear next? *…+ J. F. Sebastian’s replicants in Blade Runner have 
an expiration date. They are much better than us to keep walking around a long 
time.’ Translation by the author). 
6 ‗The crucial thing about automata is their enchainment. They can be extremely 
sophisticated but at the same time very basic in terms of what they can do‘ 
(Stephen & Timothy Quay, The PianoTuner of EarthQuakes, Press Kit, quoted in 
Buchan, 2011, p. 121). 
7 Original citation: "puede ser que, ciertamente, los autómatas no tengan de la 
vida sino una apariencia y que la posean por una conciencia apreciada por el 
dualismo cartesiano. Por lo mismo, no son más que apariencia, lo que significa 
que en ocasiones transmiten una imagen más fuerte que lo real: en efecto, 
pueden tomar una forma que se corresponde perfectamente con nuestros 
deseos." Gyger, 2009, p. XI (‘automata might certainly have no life but an 
appearance of it, and they possess it due to a conscience appreciated by 
Cartesian dualism. Therefore, they are nothing more than appearance, which 
means that sometimes they convey an image stronger than reality: indeed, they 
may take a form that perfectly matches our desires.’ Translation by the author). 
8 "A great Berkeleyan fiction in which esse est percipi is pushed to its ultimate 
consequences". Original citation: "Un grande fiction berkeleyenne dans laquelle 
le esse est percipi est poussé jusqu‘à ses dernières conséquences", Max Milner, 
1982, p. 244 (quoted in Joubert-Laurencin, 1997, p. 258). 
 28 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
9 "The foundational ‘visual premises’ of Final Fantasy — that is, the 
computational computergraphic grounding of the film’s ‘humans’ — are 
semiotically incompatible with the film’s narrative or ‘visual argument’: that 
what animates, inspires, and gives life is organic, not technological, 
production." (Sobchack, 2006, p. 176). 
10 "Animation corresponds, as Eisenstein implies, to a condition of organic 
production. Animation is not the result of the lifelessness of a mechanical 
reproduction but is itself life-giving." (Broadfoot, Butler, 1999, p. 273). 
11 Original citation: "En The Polar Express la crítica especializada y el público 
destacaron la sensación espeluznante que producía el ojo estático. Se la llamó 
entonces "síndrome del ojo muerto" (dead eye syndrome). Los modelos y la 
animación resultaban realistas, pero en los ojos se notaba esa falta de alma. Para 
paliar ese "defecto", en Beowulf el mismo equipo trabajó con un sistema de 
captura de la pupila. De todas maneras, muchos críticos destacaron 
nuevamente esa falta de alma detrás de la mirada." Dematei, 2011, p. 191 (‘In 
The Polar Express critics and the public highlighted the creepy feeling that 
produced the static eye. Then it was called ‘dead eye syndrome’. The models 
and animation were realistic, but you could tell in his eyes that lack of soul. To 
alleviate this ‘defect’ in Beowulf the same team worked with a pupil capture 
system. However, many critics noted again that lack of soul behind the eyes.’ 
Translation by the author). 
12 Inversely, the ‗illusion of life‘ is more easily achieved when human characters 
tend to be more cartoony — when the ‗deviation‘ is purposely broad —, when 
exaggeration is applied to animated movements to catch the ‗spirit‘ behind the 
actions.  
13 Original citation from Maxim Gorky’s chronicle, The Kindgom of Shadows, 
written on July 4th, 1896, when he saw the Lumière’s films at the Nizhni-
Novgorod fair in Russia: "Last night I was in the Kingdom of Shadows. If you 
only knew how strange it is to be there. It is a world without sound, without 
color. Everything there – the earth, the trees, the people, the water and the air – 
is dipped in monotonous grey. Grey rays of the sun across the grey sky, grey 
eyes in grey faces, and the leaves of the trees are ashen grey. It is not life but its 
shadow, it is not motion but its soundless spectre." (Quoted in Harding, Popple, 
1996, p. 5). 
14 Original citation: "Ce mythe moderne se distingue de la plus banale perte de 
maîtrise de l‘inventeur (dont le paradigme est Frankenstein), et enrichit celui de 
la marionnette humaine, invention du Romantisme: il s‘agit d‘une indistinction 
 29 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
entre être et paraître, combinée à un processus machinique répétitif, et entée sur 
une appréhension narcissique monstrueuse de la figure du double." (Joubert-
Laurencin, 1997, p. 257). 
15 "Mais au spectateur de cinéma, il n'est pas réservé tout à fait le sort du 
narrateur, obligé de se programmer pour l'éternité, et pour personne, acteur 
d'un "play-back funèbre dérisoire et déchirant" (Milner, p. 250)" Joubert-
Laurencin, 1997, p. 263 ("But the film spectator, it is not just quite the fate of the 
narrator have to be programmed for eternity, and for anyone, a player of a 
"funeral play-back, pathetic and heartbreaking" (Milner, p. 250)." Translation by 
the author). 
16 "Le narrateur, qui, par désespoir et par amour, finira par entrer 
volontairement dans la répétition indéfinie du spectacle autoperceptif des 
doubles, "en s’intercalant par surimpression". Comme le dit très bien Max 
Milner, se verra, au terme de l’opération, glabre, chauve, sans ongles, et enfin, 
mourra totalement écorché." Joubert-Laurencin, 1997, p. 261 ("The narrator, 
who by despair and love, will finally enter voluntarily the indefinite repetition 
of the self-perceptive spectacle of the doubles, "inserting himself by 
overprinting". In the words of Max Milner, at the end of the operation he will be 
hairless, bald, without nails, and finally dies completely skinned." Translation 
by the author). 
17 Paradoxically, such an ominous destiny was shared by real inventors, 
animation pioneers such as Plateau, Reynaud, but also by Georges Méliès and 
Émile Cohl, who endured parallel stories of self-destruction. 
18 Omar Calabrese appreciates: "Entre los casi 1200 territorios imaginarios 
catalogados por Gianni Guadalupi y Alberto Menguel en su Manuale dei luoghi 
fantastici (Rizzoli, Milán, 1982), más de la cuarta parte son islas. No se puede 
por menos de pensar que la coincidencia no es del todo casual, es decir que hay 
una relación muy estrecha entre la naturaleza misma de la isla y la posibilidad 
de inventar una." Calabrese, 2009, p. 13. (‘Among the nearly 1,200 imaginary 
territories cataloged by Gianni Guadalupi and Alberto Menguel in their Manual 
of Fantastic Places (Rizzoli, Milan, 1982), more than a quarter are islands. We 
cannot but think that the match is not entirely accidental, ie that there is a close 
relationship between the nature of the island and the possibility to invent one.’ 
Translation by the author.) 
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19 Original citation: "La verdadera esencia de la isla es su capacidad para 
producir pasiones. Así pues, la isla en realidad no existe: es siempre Neverland, 
la isla de Nunca Jamás. La isla de nuestros deseos y sentimientos." Calabrese, 
2009, p. 32. (‘The true essence of the island is its capacity to produce passions. 
Thus, the island actually doesn’t exist: it is always Neverland. The island of our 
wishes and feelings.’ Translation by the author). 
20 ‗In our officially post religious intellectual culture, we miss the idols, too. Just 
as the mad scientist still carries the negative but still highly charged projection 
of the holy man who would otherwise have no place in our living culture, the 
repressed religion is also visible in representations of puppets, robots, cyborgs, 
and other artificial humans in literature and film.‘ (Nelson, 2002, p. 20). 
